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Application of Minority and Marketability
Discounts in Appraisal Actions Under
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 351.455
Swope v. Siegel-Robert,Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Appraisal statutes are available to provide fair compensation to minority
shareholders of corporations who are squeezed out against their will. Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 351.455, the Missouri statute thatprovides for appraisal
rights in the event of a merger or consolidation, requires corporations to pay
dissenting minority shareholders "fair value" for their shares.2 The Missouri
appraisal statute does not define "fair value," nor does it provide a mathematical
formula for determining the value of dissenters' shares Rather, Missouri case
law has established that courts are to consider all relevant facts and
circumstances to determine the value of a dissenter's shares.4 A significant
question of law is whether minority and marketability discounts should be
applied.5 The various state courts are divided as to the appropriateness of both

1. 243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 198 (2001).
2. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.455 (2000).
3. See id.
4. See Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 293 S.W.2d 429,433 (Mo. 1956) ("Every
relevant fact and circumstance which enters into the value ofthe corporate property and
which reflects itself in the worth of corporate stock [should be considered].") (quoting
Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of DissentingStockholders under AppraisalStatutes, 45
HARV. L. REv. 233, 262 (1931)); Dreiseszun v. FLM Industries, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 902,
907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Phelps, 293 S.W.2d at 433).
5. See Swope, 243 F.3d at 491. Application of a minority discount in the appraisal
of a corporation is meant to account for the lack of control inherent in minority shares.
See Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal
Proceedings, 57 Bus. LAw. 127, 131 (2001). The rationale is that because a minority
shareholder who is squeezed out has no real say in how the corporation was run before
being squeezed out, and because shareholders who buy enough shares to gain control of
the company often pay a premium (known as a control premium), discounting for lack
of control avoids giving minority shareholders a windfall in the appraisal process. See
id. ("[T]he term minority discount as properly understood refers to a discount from the
price that would be set for non-control shares in an active market simply because they
are minority shares and have no power to influence the governance of the corporation and
may therefore be exposed to the possibility of looting."). Application of a marketability
discount accounts for the illiquidity of shares of a close corporation. Id. Because the
shares are not liquid, an investor would not pay full value for the shares in an arms-length
transaction, and, thus, the squeezed-out shareholder's interest in the company is worth
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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discounts. Although the Missouri Supreme Court has not yet decided the issues,
in Swope v. Seigel-Robert, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit predicted that the Missouri high court would reject both
discounts.6 Although the Eighth Circuit was probably right in rejecting a
marketability discount, it may have been wrong in concluding that the Missouri
Supreme Court would reject a minority discount.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Siegel-Robert, Inc., a closely-held Missouri corporation ("Company"), was
formed in 1946 by Bruce Robert as a part-time chrome-plating business.7
Beginning in the 1980s, the Company experienced a great deal of growth
through an aggressive program ofacquiring manufacturing companies. 8 On July
19, 1997, Halvor B. Anderson, Siegel-Robert's Chief Executive Operating
Officer,9 proposed a cash out merger'0 that would allow the Company to make

less than the pro rata value of the company. See id. ("[A] marketability discount refers
to a discount from what a fair trading price would be if there were an active market for
the shares.").
6. Swope, 243 F.3d at 491,497.
7. Id. at 489.
8. Id. The Company first acquired Correl, Inc., a manufacturer of stacking chairs,
multi-purpose folding tables, bookcases, and computer furniture, in 1982. Swope v.
Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (E.D. Mo. 1999), affd in part,rev 'din part,
243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 198 (2001). The Company's other
acquisitions included: Continental Disc Corporation, a manufacturer of custom rupture
discs and over-pressure and vacuum release devices used in industrial environments
(1988); Sensidyne, Inc., a manufacturer of toxic gas detection systems and a pump used
by industrial hygienists (1990); Advantek, a producer of packaging material for semiconductors (1992); and Dolch Computer Systems, Inc., a manufacturer of a specialized
line of industrial portable computers (1996). Id. at 880-8 1.
9. Swope, 243 F.3d at 489. Anderson became the Company's Chief Executive
Operating Officer in October 1996, after working his way up through the company ranks
during a fifteen-year tenure of employment. Id.
10. Merger statutes that allow cash to be given to shareholders in consideration for
their stock in a merger implicitly allow majority shareholders to force out minority
shareholders via a merger of the corporation with a shell corporation. Elliott J. Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: A HistoricalPerspective,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 624
(1981). Such a squeeze-out can be accomplished as follows:
[A] majority can transfer its shares in a corporation to a shell corporation and
then cause the original corporation to be merged into the shell with all the
current shareholders of the original corporation exchanging their shares for
cash. After the minority is paid off, the shell corporation, which is wholly
owned by the original corporation's majority shareholders, owns the original
corporation's business.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6
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an S corporation election in order to avoid taxation at both the corporate and
shareholder levels." On July 21, the board of directors voted to recommend the
merger to the shareholders, and Anderson mailed a notice of vote to the
On July 31, the required majority of
shareholders on the same day.'
shareholders approved the proposed merger at a shareholders meeting called to
consider the merger.' 3 Siegel-Robert, Inc., a Missouri corporation, was then
merged into Siegel-Robert, Inc., a Nevada corporation, which was the surviving
14
corporation.
Anderson valued the shares of the minority shareholders who were
squeezed out of Siegel-Robert as a result of the merger at twenty dollars per
share, taking into consideration the lack of a market for the stock, the fact that
the Company had traditionally repurchased shares for sixty-five percent below
book value, the expectation that income for the shares for the next year would
decrease, and historical dividend figures.'5 In its opinion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that Anderson:

Id. (footnote omitted). For the historical development of statutes that allow cash-out
mergers, see generally Weiss, supra. Such mergers are also known as "take-out,"
"squeeze-out," or "freeze-out" mergers. NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d
1416, 1417 n.1 (8th Cir. 1993); Richard A. Booth, The NewLaw ofFreeze-outMergers,
49 Mo. L. REv. 517, 517 n.2 (1984). Missouri's General and Business Corporations law
allows for cash-out mergers. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.410.3 (2000).
11. Swope, 243 F.3d at 489. Corporate taxes for 1997 were $41 million, while
corporate taxes for 1998 were projected to be only $5 million as a result of the
Company's S corporation election. Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 885. In order to qualify for
S corporation status, a corporation must, among other things, have no more than seventyfive shareholders. Swope, 243 F.3d at 489; see also I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (2000).
When Anderson proposed the merger, the Company had sixty-three shareholders; forty
were family members ofBruce Robert, the Company's founder, representing ownership
of ninety-three percent of the Company's stock, and twenty-three were non-family
members, representing ownership of seven percent of Company stock. Swope, 74 F.
Supp. 2d at 879 n.3. Although the number of Company shareholders was already within
the maximum number allowable for an S corporation, the Company felt that the merger
would guarantee that the number of shareholders would not grow too large in the future.
See Swope, 243 F.3d at 489. In addition, having non-family shareholders would increase
the risk of "re-opening the tax issue," because a unanimous vote of shareholders was
required for the Company to make an S corporation election. Id.; see also I.R.C. §
1362(a)(2) (2000). Anderson admitted that the Company's S corporation status could
have been protected by amending the by-laws to disallow the sale of shares in such a
manner that would jeopardize the Company's S corporation election, but the Company
nevertheless opted to cash out the non-family shareholders. Swope, 243 F.3d at 489.
12. Id.
13. Id. at490.
14. Id.
15. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 6
MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 67

[D]id not consult the Board of Directors, an appraiser, an evaluation
professional, an accountant, a member of senior management, or any
family or non-family members, nor did he consider appointing a
committee to determine a fair value or to explore whether there was a
duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders.16
At the shareholders meeting on July 31, 1997, a majority of non-family
shareholders voted against the merger and requested that Anderson reconsider
the twenty dollar share price and hire an appraiser. 7 Anderson declined and the
merger was approved. 8 Eleven of the non-family shareholders accepted the
twenty dollar offer, but the others made a written demand on the Company for
a higher price for their stock. 9 When the Company refused to increase its offer,
some of the minority shareholders filed suit in federal district court under
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 351.455, requesting fair value for their
stock.2 °

16. Id. Anderson had extensive experience appraising companies in his capacity
as the person in charge of the Company's acquisition program. Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d
at 884. Anderson estimated the fair market value of the Company based on "book value
of the shares, earnings per year, the dividend history, and the rate projected to pay those
dividends." Id. at 884, 886. Anderson also applied a minority discount of forty-five
percent. Id. at 886; see supra note 5.
17. Swope, 243 F.3d at 490. Of the twenty-three non-family shareholders, fifteen
voted against the merger, five abstained or were not present at the meeting, and three
voted in favor of the merger. Id. The three non-family shareholders who voted in favor
of the merger were Anderson and two other Company employees, who owned small
blocks of Company stock. Id.; Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 885. Although Anderson was
a shareholder, his principal interest was in his position as Chief Executive Operating
Officer, for which his compensation, including salary and bonus, was about $1.4 million
annually from 1995 to 1997. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
18. Swope, 243 F.3d at 490.
19. Id.
20. Id. The minority shareholders could not elect to remain shareholders by
refusing to sell their shares. Their only two options were to sell their interests in the
Company at twenty dollars per share or to bring an appraisal action. See supranote 10.
Section 351.455 provides for the valuation of the interests of minority shareholders of
a corporation who object to a proposed merger. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.455 (2000).
The statute requires minority shareholders to: (1) file with the corporation a written
objection to the proposed merger prior to or at the shareholders meeting at which the plan
is to be submitted to the shareholders for a vote, (2) not vote in favor of the merger, and
(3) make a written demand on the surviving or new corporation for payment of the fair
value of the shares within twenty days of the merger. Id. § 351.455.1. If the dissenting
shareholders and the corporation are unable to agree on a fair price for the shares, the
shareholders can file suit "asking for a finding and determination ofthe fair value ofsuch
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6
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At the ensuing bench trial, expert witnesses valued the stock from as little
as $30.00 per share2' to as much as $98.40 per share. 2 The witnesses used three
different methods of valuing the company: (1) "enterprise interest," which
values a company based on what it could be sold for as a going concern, (2)
"marketable minority interest," which assumes a market for the shares but
discounts for the lack of control of minority shares, and (3) "non-marketable
minority interest," which discounts the shares forboth lack of control and lack
of a market for the shares. 3 The district court held that a minority discount was
appropriate but a lack of marketability discount was not. 4 The court valued the
dissenters' shares at $63.36 per share?25 The court also awarded prejudgment
interest.26 The Company appealed the judgment, and the minority shareholders
cross-appealed to contest the application of a minority discount and the
prejudgment interest rate the district court applied.27

shares," and the judgment shall be "for the amount of such fair value as of the day prior
to the date on which such vote was taken approving such merger or consolidation,
together with interest thereon to the date of such judgment." Id. § 351.455.3. The
district court found that it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Swope, 243
F.3d at 490.
21. The Company's own expert valued the dissenting shareholders' stock at arange
from $30.00 to $46.20 per share-at least fifty percent higher than the twenty dollar offer
the Company made to the minority shareholders. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
22. Id. at 885, 887.
23. Swope, 243 F.3d at 490. The Company also submitted evidence that the estate
of one of the dissenting shareholders valued Company shares at $18.50 for estate and
inheritance tax purposes. Id.
24. Id.; see also supranote 5 and accompanying text.
25. Swope, 243 F.3d at 490.
26. Id. The court awarded 5.115% simple interest based on the fifty-two-week TBill pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, which sets forth the interest rate for money judgments
in civil cases decided in federal court. Id.
27. Id. at 490. The dissenting shareholders contended that an interest rate of nine
percent should have been applied pursuant to Missouri Revised Statues Section 408.020.
Id. at 497. The court agreed with the dissenting shareholders. Id. In addition to
appealing the judgment, the Company also filed a Rule 60(b) motion, asking the court
to consider an Internal Revenue Servicereport that valued the Company's majority stock
at $45.69 per share for estate tax purposes. Id. at 490; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The district court denied the motion, but agreed to consolidate the appeals of both the
judgment and the Rule 60(b) disposition. Swope, 243 F.3d at 490-91.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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After setting forth the facts of the case in its opinion,28 the trial court
detailed the expert witnesses' valuations of the Company.29 The court noted that,
although many methods of valuation can be utilized, they generally fall into three
approaches: (1) the asset-based approach, which values each of the business
units individually, adds them together, and subtracts corporate liabilities,
resulting in shareholder equity; (2) the market approach, which compares the
corporation with similar corporations; and (3) the income approach, which
"attempts to value a business'entity at a given time based on present value of
future economic income estimated to be realized by owners of the company." 3
The court then detailed and evaluated the appraisal of Robert Reilly, the
plaintiff s expert. 31 Reilly calculated the enterprise value, that is, the value of the
Company as a going concern without applying discounts, to be $98.40 per share,
the marketable minority interest value to be $72.90 per share, and the nonmarketable minority interest value to be $72.90 per share.3 2 Reilly testified that
Missouri statutes and relevant literature required valuing the Company at its
enterprise value, and, according to Reilly, applying the other levels of valuation
3
in this case would result in the unjust enrichment of the majority shareholders.
Reilly also testified that, in arriving at his appraisal value, he only considered
data that were generated before the date of the merger.3 4 He observed that the
Company's book value35 of $33.82 per share was a floor value that is a useful
measure for liquidation purposes but not for appraising a going business. 6

28. Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879-87 (E.D. Mo. 1999),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part,243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 198 (2001).
Judge Webber delivered the opinion of the court. Id. at 879.
29. Id. at 887-910.
30. Id. at 887.
31. Id. at 887-900. Reilly was formerly national director of valuation services as
a partner with Deloitte & Touche before joining Williamette Company, where he
structured and facilitated transactions. Id. at 887-88. Reilly was a certified public
accountant and a member of the American Society of Appraisers. Id. at 888.
32. Id. at 887; see also supratext accompanying notes 22-23.
33. Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
34. Id. at 889. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 351.455 provides that the
judgment shall be "for the amount of such fair value as of the day prior to the date on
which such vote was taken approving such merger or consolidation." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.455.3 (2000). This has the effect of preventing dissenting shareholders from
benefitting from corporate actions taken subsequent to the merger. In the instant case,
the value of the minority shares was not increased by the expected tax savings from the
anticipated Subchapter S election. See supra note 11.
35. Book value, an accounting concept, is "[t]he value at which an asset is carried
on a balance sheet." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 177 (7th ed. 1999).
36. Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6
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Reilly utilized three approaches in his appraisal: 37 (1) the income approach
method," (2) the direct capitalization method,39 and (3) the guideline publicly
traded company method,4 first valuing each of the six units separately and then
aggregating the values.4'
The court then considered the testimony of the Company's experts.4" One
of those experts, Z. Christopher Mercer, provided testimony that poked holes in
the testimony of Reilly.43 Mercer criticized Reilly's "definition of fair value,
application of his guideline company method, application of his direct
capitalization method, application of his discounted cash flow method, and
application of a control premium."' The Company also offered the testimony
of Kenneth Wayne Patton.45 Patton testified that both a minority and
marketability discount should be applied to the valuation because there was no

37. Id.
38. "The income approach attempts to value a business entity at a given time based
on present value of future economic income estimated to be realized by owners of the
company." Id. at 887.
39. The direct capitalization method involves "capitalization of a period estimate
of economic income by a direct capitalization rate." Id.
40. The guideline publicly traded company method compares publicly-traded
companies to the company being valued. Id.
41. Reilly valued each of the divisions of the Company separately and then
aggregated the values. Id. at 890. The court criticized Reilly's appraisal for selecting a
growth rate for the Advantek unit of seven percent, which the court held was too high.
Id. at 894. The court also faulted Reilly's selection of a beta of 0.38 for the Correl, Inc.
unit, which the court thought was substantially too low. Id. at 895. (Beta is a measure
of a company's risk as an investment; higher betas reflect higher risk and lower betas
reflect lower risk.) Id. at 906. The court, thus, concluded that Reilly's valuation of
Correl, Inc. was inflated. Id. at 895. The court criticized Reilly's valuation of the
Continental Disc Corporation for its low beta and for his rounding in his calculations.
Id. at 896. The court criticized Reilly's growth rate in his appraisal of the Dolch
Computer Systems, Inc. unit as being too high, and the beta Reilly selected for the
Sensidyne, Inc. unit as being too low. Id. at 896-97. The trial court also had the same
criticisms of Reilly's valuation of the Company's Automotive & Appliance Division.
Id. at 898. The court also criticized Reilly's rounding in his valuation of the
Consolidated unit as well as the subjectivity of the method he used. Id. at 898-99.
42. Id. at 900-10.
43. Id. at 900. Mercer owned Mercer Capital Management, Inc., which provides
valuation services. Id. He was formerly a member of the Board of Examiners of the
American Society of Appraisers. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 903. Patton is president of Mercer Capital, which is wholly owned by
Mercer and Patton. Id. He was formerly vice chair of the Board of Examiners of the
American Society of Appraisers, and he performs several hundred appraisals annually.
Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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market for the minority shares and because the minority shareholders lacked any
degree of control of the Company.'
The trial court then turned to Missouri law to determine whether minority
and marketability discounts should be used and concluded that such a
determination is in the discretion of the trial court.47 The court then surveyed the
law of other jurisdictions,4" and, based on this, concluded that a minority
discount should be applied to the valuation, but a marketability discount should
not.49
On the parties' appeal and cross-appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit considered, as a matter of law to be considered de novo,
whether minority and lack of marketability discounts should be applied to the
value of a dissenter's shares under Missouri law.5" The court held that when
minority shareholders bring suit under Missouri Revised Statutes Section
351.455, minority and marketability discounts should not be applied because
such discounts would frustrate the purpose of the valuation statute, which is to
protect the interests of minority shareholders. 5' Thus, the appellate court
reversed the district court's application of a minority discount but affirmed the
district court's refusal to apply a marketability discount and remanded the case
for a determination of "fair value" without the application of either discount.52
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 351.455 provides minority shareholders
of a corporation protection from the decisions of majority shareholders by
providing for payment of the "fair value of [their] shares"'53 in the event that the

46. Id.
47. Id. at 916.
48. Id. at 916-22.
49. Id. at 922.
50. Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 198 (2001).
51. Id. at 494-95.
52. Id. at 499.
53. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.455.1 (2000). Section 351.455 reads in full:
1. If a shareholder of a corporation which is a party to a merger or
consolidation shall file with such corporation, prior to or at the meeting of
shareholders at which the plan of merger or consolidation is submitted to a
vote, a written objection to such plan ofmerger or consolidation, and shall not
vote in favor thereof, and such shareholder, within twenty days after the
merger or consolidation is effected, shall make written demand on the
surviving or new corporation for payment of the fair value of his shares as of
the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken approving the merger
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6
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minority shareholders are "squeezed out" by a corporate merger or
consolidation. 4 The statute was the result of a legislative bargain that allowed
majority shareholders to make fundamental changes in a corporation with less
than unanimous shareholder consent as was required under the common law. ss

or consolidation, the surviving or new corporation shall pay to such
shareholder, upon surrender of his certificate or certificates representing said
shares, the fair value thereof. Such demand shall state the number and class
of the shares owned by such dissenting shareholder. Any shareholder failing
to make demand within the twenty day period shall be conclusively presumed
to have consented to the merger or consolidation and shall be bound by the
terms thereof.
2. If within thirty days after the date on which such merger or consolidation
was effected the value of such shares is agreed upon between the dissenting
shareholder and the surviving or new corporation, payment therefor shall be
made within ninety days after the date on which such merger or consolidation
was effected, upon the surrender of his certificate or certificates representing
said shares. Upon payment of the agreed value the dissenting shareholder
shall cease to have any interest in such shares or in the corporation.
3. If within such period of thirty days the shareholder and the surviving or
new corporation do not so agree, then the dissenting shareholder may, within
sixty days after the expiration of the thirty day period, file a petition in any
court of competent jurisdiction within the county in which the registered
office of the surviving or new corporation is situated, asking for a finding and
determination of the fair value of such shares, and shall be entitled to
judgment against the surviving or new corporation for the amount of such fair
value as ofthe day prior to the date on which such vote was taken approving
such merger or consolidation, together with interest thereon to the date of
such judgment. Thejudgment shall bepayable only upon and simultaneously
with the surrender to the surviving or new corporation of the certificate or
certificates representing said shares. Upon the payment of the judgment, the
dissenting shareholder shall cease to have any interest in such shares, or in the
surviving or new corporation. Such shares may be held and disposed of by
the surviving or new corporation as it may see fit. Unless the dissenting
shareholder shall file such petition within the time herein limited, such
shareholder and all persons claiming under him shall be conclusively
presumed to have approved and ratified the merger or consolidation, and shall
be bound by the terms thereof.
4. The right of a dissenting shareholder to be paid the fair value of his shares
as herein provided shall cease if and when the corporation shall abandon the
merger or consolidation.
54. Id. § 351.455.
55. See Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 876, 912 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
affd in part, rev'd in part, 243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 198 (2001)
("[Dissenting shareholders' statutes represent] protection given minority shareholders in
exchange for dispensing with the necessity of securing unanimous consent of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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In order to be entitled to receive "fair value" for their shares, the statute
requires dissenting shareholders to file with the corporation a written objection
to the proposed consolidation or merger prior to the shareholders meeting in
which a vote is to be taken on the consolidation or merger.5 6 In addition, a
dissenting shareholder must not vote in favor of the merger and must make a
written demand within twenty days after the merger or consolidation on the
surviving or new corporation "for payment of the fair value of his shares as of
the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken approving the merger or
consolidation."57 Failure to provide such demand to the corporation will give
rise to a presumption that the shareholder consented to the corporate action.5"
If the dissenting shareholder can come to an agreement with the corporation
concerning the value of the shares within thirty days after the merger or
consolidation, the corporation is required to pay that amount within ninety days
after the corporate action, and the dissenting shareholder must surrender his or
her certificates.5 9 This surrender extinguishes the shareholder's interest in the
corporation. ° If the dissenting shareholders and the corporation fail to come to
an agreement concerning the value of the dissenting shareholder's shares within
thirty days, the dissenter has sixty days to file an appraisal action requesting a
court to determine the "fair value" of the shares and to order payment of that
amount.6' Upon payment of the judgment, the shareholder's interest in the
corporation is extinguished.62 Failure to petition a court for relief within the
allotted time gives rise to a presumption that the shareholder consented to the

shareholders for the sale of all [or] substantially all of the corporate assets.") (quoting
Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo.
1968)). Although Flarsheim dealt specifically with Section 351.405, which provides
protection in the event of a sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets, the
Swope court applied the same reasoning to Section 351.455. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d
at 912. The common law required unanimous shareholder consent "as a prerequisite to
fundamental corporate change." Id. However, Missouri Revised Statutes, Chapter 33,
Article 6, Section 5361 (1939), the precursor to Missouri Revised Statutes Section
351.455, required a three-fifths majority of shareholders to approve a merger, while
Section 351.455 requires a two-thirds majority. Id.
56. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.455.1 (2000).
57. Id. "Such demand shall state the number and class ofthe shares owned by such
dissenting shareholder." Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. § 351.455.2.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 351.455.3.
62. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/6
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corporate action.6' If the corporation abandons its plans to merge or consolidate,
the dissenter no longer has a right to be paid fair value for his or her shares."
Although many jurisdictions have similar appraisal statutes, the definition
of "fair value" varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the law in Missouri
on the issue is unsettled.65 While the Missouri statute requires corporations to
pay squeezed-out shareholders the fair value of their shares, the statute does not
state how fair value is tobecalulated.l The Missouri Supreme Court discussed
the meaning of "fair value" in Phelpsv. Watson-Stillman Co.:

In the various statutes the terms "value," "fair value," "fair cash
value," and "fair market value" are abstract and in a sense perhaps
meaningless .... [T]hey nevertheless have the same general meaning
and purposefully if not wisely establish a flexible general standard for
fixing value between parties who are either unable or unwilling to
voluntarily agree. As previously noted, there is no simple
mathematical formula and each case presents its particular problem,
but in general some of the factors to be considered and weighted are
asset value, earnings, dividends, management, and"every relevant fact
and circumstance which enters into the value of the corporate property
and which reflects itself in the worth of corporate stock."'67
Whether to apply minority and marketability discounts is an essential issue
to resolve in appraisal actions.6" Missouri case law interpreting Missouri69
Revised Statutes Section 351.455 is sparse. InPhelpsv. Watson-Stillman Co.,
the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the valuation of a referee who had been
appointed by the trial court to determine the fair value of dissenters' shares.7" In
Phelps, the referee established the net asset value, that is, liquidation value, of
the corporation.7' The Phelpscourt rejected using that method as the sole means

63. Id.
64. Id. § 351.455.4.
65. See Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486,491 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 198 (2001).
66. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.455 (2000).
67. Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 293 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Mo. 1956) (quoting
Norman D. Lattin, Remedies ofDissentingShareholdersunderAppraisalStatutes, 45
HAR. L. REv. 233, 262 (1931).
68. See Swope, 243 F.3d at 490.
69. 293 S.W.2d 429,432 (Mo. 1956).
70. Id. at 432.
71. See id. at 431-432.
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of determining fair value of dissenters' shares.72 The Phelpscourt, however, did
not address whether to apply minority or marketability discounts.73
The most recent Missouri appraisal rights case addressing whether to apply
minority or marketability discounts is King v. F. T.J, Inc.74 The King court held
that the application of minority and marketability discounts rests within the
"sound discretion of the trier of fact after every relevant fact and circumstance
is considered."75 King gives only limited guidance as to when such discounts
should be applied because it merely found that the trial court had not erred in
declining to apply a marketability discount to the dissenters' stock.76 Still, the
King court did reason that application of a minority discount may be appropriate
when:
The judgment of the trial court reflects the fact that in the case at bar,
Karen King's status as a minority shareholder diminished the value of
her stock to the extent that the stock represented her interest in the
active operation of the insurance agency and her lack of a controlling
voice in that aspect of the company's business, but not to the extent
that her stock represented an interest in the saleable assets held by the
company that were not necessary in the operation of the insurance
agency business.

77

This reflects the reason most often cited by courts for applying a minority
discount, that is, "that minority shareholders' lack of control over significant
corporate decisions diminishes the value of their stock, and that the fair value of
their stock must reflect this reality."78
Dreiseszun v. FLMIndustries,Inc.,' a Section 351.405 appraisal case, 0
gives support to applying Section 351.405 cases' defiition of "fair value" to
Section 351.455 cases."' The Dreiseszuncourt rejected application ofa minority
discount, reasoning:

72. Id. at 432.
73. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
74. 765 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
75. Id. at 306.
76. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
77. King, 765 S.W.2d at 306.
78. Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
79. 577 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
80. Section 351.405 is the appraisal statute for the sale of all or substantially all of
a corporation's assets. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.405 (2000).
81. Dreiseszun, 577 S.W.2d at 905-06.
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It would appear, therefore, that the court below in the situation before
it would place a different "fair value" per share upon the same
classification and kind of stock in a corporation depending upon
whether the shares were held by a majority or a minority stockholder,
and would find the value of the minority shares to be the amount
which the majority stockholders were willing to pay for the minority
shares and which a minority shareholder was willing to accept,
whether a "fair value" or not, and hold the other minority shareholders
to the consequences of that decision. Such is not the legal import or
effect of § 351.405. .

.

. This statute does not by terms or any

reasonable interpretation intend that a minority shareholder be in any
way penalized for resorting to the remedy afforded thereunder....
The minority dissenting shareholders ... enjoyed certain fundamental

rights as common stockholders in [the company], which are thus
generally expressed in 18 C.J.S. Corporation § 215, p. 648: "A
common stockholder is an owner of the enterprise in proportion that
his stock bears to the entire stock and ordinarily he is entitled to
participate in the management, profits and ultimate distribution of
assets of the corporation." Or, as stated differently, a share of
common stock is evidence of unit ownership of the whole, each unit
being of equal value such that their sum equals the value of whole. 18
C.J.S. Corporations § 515, p. 1194.2
Dreiseszun thus requires valuation of a company as a going concern without
applying minority or marketability discounts when arriving at a "fair value"
under Section 351.405. 83
The most recent judicial application of Missouri Revised Statutes Section
351.455 prior to Swope was Hunter v. Mitek Industries,Inc." The Huntercourt
followedDreiseszun'sconclusion that bothminority and marketability discounts
should be rejected: "Under Missouri law, the dissenting shareholder is entitled
to his proportionate interest or pro rata share in the overall fair value of the
corporation, appraised as a going concern. 8' Thus, Hunter used the enterprise
value to valuate the dissenting shareholders' shares.86 Hunter also cited
Flarsheim regarding the purpose of Section 351.455: "The purpose of the

82. Id. at 906, 908 (quoted in Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 914).
83. See Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 915. Although King quoted Dreiseszun, it
rejected Dreiseszun'srejection of a minority discount, and held that application of such
a discount was in the discretion of the trier of fact. See King, 765 S.W.2d at 306.
84. 721 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
85. Id. at 1106.
86. Id.
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appraisal statute is to award the dissenter the value of what he owned, his
proportionate interest in the going concern, in exchange for giving up his control
power over significant changes."87 Hunterfurther reasoned that Section 351.455
"was designed primarily for the protection of the dissenting shareholders and the
award of fair value being the substitute for the control power or value the
minority relinquished."88
Other state courts have also interpreted appraisal statutes that are similar to
Section 351.455, the most significant being Delaware and Illinois. In Rapid89 the Delaware high court held that
American Corp. v. Harris,
dissenting
shareholders' shares should be valued according to the corporation's enterprise
value without imposing either a minority or a marketability discount.9 In
contrast, an Illinois appellate court affirmed a trial court's imposition of minority
and marketability discounts in Weigel BroadcastingCo. v. Smith.9 Delaware
precedent is important because of "Delaware's experience in questions of
corporate law,"' while Illinois precedent is important because Missouri's
appraisal statute was patterned after the Illinois statute.93 In other states, "a
number of courts have held that application of discounts is discretionary and was
proper in the circumstances of the case."94 At the same time, some courts have
applied a marketability discount while rejecting a minority discount," while
other courts have rejected both discounts.96
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first held that
application of both marketability and minority discounts was not warranted in
the instant case. The court began its analysis by stating:
[W]hile the ultimate determination of fair value is a question of fact,
the determination of whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant
to fair value under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 351.455 is a question of law which

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
Kansas).
95.
96.

Id. at 1106-07.
Id. at 1107.
603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
Id. at 805.
682 N.E.2d 745 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
Swope, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
Id.
Id. at 918 (citing cases from Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, Indiana, and
Id. (citing cases from New York, Oregon, and Kentucky).
Id. (citing cases from Nebraska and Maryland).
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we review de novo. In the present case, the Company contends that
the lack of control over minority shares and the absence of a liquid
market are relevant circumstances which reduce the value of the stock,
warranting not only a minority discount, but also a lack of
marketability discount. On de novo review of these issues of law, we
disagree. 97
Next, the court noted the rule ofDreiseszunv. FLMIndus., Inc., that "every
relevant fact and circumstance" should be considered in valuing a company. 98
The court reasoned that, rather than imposing a "simple mathematical standard,"
the Missouri Supreme Court has established "a flexible general standard" for
fixing the value of a company,99 and the determination of fair value "rests within
the sound discretion of the trier of fact after every relevant fact and circumstance
is considered." 100 Whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant, however, is
a matter of law that the appeals court reviews de novo."'
The court then looked to the purpose of the appraisal statute for guidance
in deciding whether minority and marketability discounts are relevant facts and
circumstances.0 2 The appraisal statute was enacted to balance the General
Assembly's decision to allow major corporate transactions to be effected with
majority rather than unanimous shareholder consent. 3 According to the court,
in order to protect minority shareholders "from being deprived of their
ownership interests," the appraisal statute provided an "equitable remedy" to
compensate minority shareholders and "ensur[e] that they retain the same
proportionate value of their stock regardless of undesired changes dictated by
majority vote." ' Based on this, the court found that "the proper valuation of
minority stock must calculate the value of the corporation as a whole and award
a pro-rata share of that value to the dissenting shareholders."'0 5 This value, the
court concluded, should be equal to the value of majority shares."1 The court
cited the approach of the American Law Institute, which does not impose a
minority discount and which also shuns a marketability discount "absent
97. Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486,491 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 198 (2001).
98. Id. (quoting Dreiseszun v. FLM Indus., Inc., 577 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979)).
99. Id. (quoting Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 293 S.W.2d429,433 (Mo. 1956)).
100. Id. (quoting King v. F.T.J., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 491-92.
105. Id. at 492.
106. Id.
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extraordinary circumstances."' 7 The court then distinguished "fair value" from
"fair market value": "Contrary to the Company's contention, 'fair value' in
minority stock appraisal cases is not equivalent to 'fair market value.""'1 8
The court then contrasted the appraisal statute's purpose of giving
dissenting shareholders the value of their shares before the merger with the
purpose of marketability discounts and found them incompatible: "The purpose
of a marketability discount is to 'adjust for a lack of liquidity in one's interest in
an entity, on the theory that there is a limited supply of potential buyers for stock
in a closely-held corporation."" 9 Because dissenting shareholders in an
appraisal action are not willing sellers, the court concluded that a marketability
discount is inappropriate."0 In support of this finding, the court stated that "[t]he
marketability discount is incompatible with the purpose of the appraisal right,
which provides dissenting shareholders with a forum for recapturing their
complete investment in the corporation after they are unwillingly subjected to
substantial corporate changes beyond their control."'
The court further
reasoned that "[i]mposing a marketability discount would benefit the majority
shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders, in direct conflict with
the purpose of the statute."'"12 The court held:
We conclude that the market for minority stock in a dissenting
shareholders' appraisal proceeding, absent extraordinary circumstances, is not a relevant fact or circumstance to consider when
determining fair value. We hold that the facts of the present case do
not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting a discount for
lack of marketability in the determination of the fair value of the stock.
Rather, the illiquid nature of the stock is precisely the type of minority
stock held in a close corporation which Missouri's appraisal statute is
designed to protect. To remain consistent with this purpose of
compensating the dissenting shareholders for the full proportionate
value of their stock, we affirm the decision of the district court to
refrain from discounting the minority stock for lack of marketability.
...Because the district court's determination of the stock price falls

107. Id. (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING FAIR
VALUE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.22(a) (1994)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 493 (quoting Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738,
747 (N.J. 1999)).
110. Id.
I11. Id.
112. Id.
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within the range proposed by the experts
discussed in its opinion, we
' 3
hold that there has been no error.
Turning to the question of minority discounts, the court again contrasted the
purpose of the appraisal statute with the purpose of the discount and found these
two purposes to conflict as well."' According to the court, the purpose of a
minority discount is to account for lack of control, but because the dissenting
shareholders are not willing sellers, to impose a discount for the fact that they
would have trouble selling their shares would result in giving them less in
compensation than what they are being forced to give up.' ' The court stated that
"[w]e .. .hold that minority status of the stock is not a relevant fact or
circumstance to be considered in a dissenting shareholders' appraisal proceeding.
Therefore, a minority discount is incompatible with the accurate determination
of fair value under § 351.455." 16
V. COMMENT

Although the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit is compelling with regard to imposing'marketability discounts, it falls
short with regard to minority discounts. The purpose of Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 351.455 is to compensate minority shareholders for the prop erty
they are forced to sell against their will. Under the common law, minority
shareholders were protected by their ability to veto any major corporate action,
and the appraisal statute was designed to protect minority shareholders when the
common law rule was abandoned in favor of majority rule in corporate actions.
Allowing for majority rule provides corporations with the flexibility to make
decisions withoutbeingbogged down by minority shareholders who could delay
the process by holding out for unreasonable terms and, at the same time, the
appraisal statute ensures that minority shareholders who are squeezed out will
be compensated fairly for their ownership interest.
In Swope, the court reasoned that the majority shareholders would receive
a windfall if they could force minority shareholders to sell their shares when
there was not a market for them, as in the case of a close corporation. In effect,
the majority shareholders would be the only market, and they would have the
power to set the price they would pay. By applying a marketability discount in
an appraisal action, the court would only assist the majority shareholders in
being unfair to minority shareholders. Besides being unfair to the plaintiffs in

113. Id. at 494.
114. Id. at 495.

115. See id.
116. Id. at 496.
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the instant case, such court action would encourage majority shareholders to
squeeze out minority shareholders in the hope of receiving such a windfall.
There is some question, however, as to whether Section 351.455 was the
result of a legislative bargain as both the trial court and the appeals court assume.
Both the trial court and the appeals court remarked that the statute was a
legislative bargain that replaced the protection of requiring unanimous
shareholder consent with the protection of ensuring that minority shareholders
who were squeezed out in the event of a merger were fairly compensated. But
it is not completely clear that such a bargain was struck in Missouri. The
plaintiffs rely onFlarsheimv. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp."'7 forthe
proposition that such a bargain took place in relation to Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 351.405, which deals with appraisal when a corporation sells or
exchanges all or substantially all of its assets and property." 8 The plaintiffs
argued that the same reasoning should apply to appraisals under Section
351.455." 9 The defendants countered with the argument that such a bargain
never took place because the "Missouri legislature has never predicated a
statutory merger on the shareholders' unanimous consent."' 20 The 1939 statute
that preceded Section 351.455 required a three-fifths vote of the shareholders to
approve a merger.'2 ' Thus, Section 351.455, which requires a two-thirds
shareholder vote, actually increases the percentage of shareholders that would
be required to approve a merger.2 2 Although the trial court agreed with this
point, it rejected the defendant's argument. The court reasoned that the common
law required unanimous consent for "fundamental corporate change,"'" and "the
Missouri legislature did diminish minority shareholders' power when it first
removed this common law requirement of unanimity,"'2 4 apparently because
appraisal statutes protected minority shareholders by ensuring that they would
receive fair value.' I
It is also possible that in refusing to apply a minority discount the Eighth
Circuit could actually be giving minority shareholders a windfall. When shares
of a corporation are traded publicly, they trade at a discount to account for the
lack of control, but when a person purchases a large block of stock that would
give him or her control of a company, the shares are often sold at a price that is
117. 432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1968).

118. Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 876, 911-12 (E.D. Mo. 1999),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 198 (2001).
119. Id. at 912.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.

125. See id.
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higher than the current market price to reflect a control premium. When the
Eighth Circuit required the trial court to give the plaintiffs a pro rata share of the
value of the corporation as a going concern, the court in effect gave the plaintiffs
a pro rata share of the control premium also, but, as minority shareholders, the
plaintiffs did not have control of the Company, so they did not lose control in the
squeeze-out. Thus, giving the minority shareholders a pro rata share of the
corporation may have given them a windfall.
Another troubling aspect of the court's decision is the fact that the Eighth
Circuit disregarded a Missouri court of appeals decision that made the imposition
of marketability and minority discounts a matter of the trial court's discretion.
After evaluating the appropriate Missouri case law, the trial court in Swope
concluded that, in Missouri, trial courts have discretion concerning whether to
apply such discounts, but the Eighth Circuit concluded as a matter of law that
neither discount should be applied. The court acknowledged that its decision cut
against Missouri precedent but, nonetheless, concluded that if the Missouri
Supreme Court decided a Section 351.455 case, it would overturn the precedent
of the lower Missouri courts. The issue seems to be whether the Missouri
Supreme Court would follow Delaware law, which is quite influential in
corporate law matters, or Illinois law, which was the basis for Missouri's
appraisal statute. It seems that the question could go either way, and given that
both a Missouri appeals court and a United States district court had previously
concluded that Missouri would follow Illinois cases, the Swope trial court and
the Eighth Circuit should also have followed Illinois precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Missouri Supreme Court has not decided a Section 351.455
case that directly addresses the issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit predicted that the Missouri high court would reject both minority
and marketability discounts. Although the Swope court's reasoning with regard
to marketability discounts is persuasive, the case for rejecting minority discounts
is less persuasive. The purpose of the appraisal statute is to compensate
dissenting shareholders for what has been taken from them against their
will-their ownership interest in a corporation. Because the context is that of a
forced sale to the majority shareholders, it would be inequitable to discount
minority shares for the lack of a market. To do so would encourage squeezeouts and provide a windfall to corporations who constitute the only market for
the shares.
The purpose of minority discounts, on the other hand, is to account for the
lack of control inherent in minority shares. Because control over corporate
decisions is valuable, and because shares which would give the buyers control
over a corporation often trade at a premium, giving dissenting shareholders apro
rata share of the company without accounting for the lack of control would give
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dissenters a windfall. Thus, the Swope court was probably wrong to reject
minority discounts as a matter of law.
BRIAN D. ROGERS
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